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Abstract 
This article develops and discusses the argument that it is difficult to make an ethical 
or economic case against free movement of workers. The analysis that leads to this 
conclusion also enables us to demonstrate that free movement is not only feasible but 
also more efficient compared to restrictive/protectionist policies. Another implication 
of the analysis in this paper is that a multilateral framework similar to that of World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) – e.g., a World Migration Organisation (WMO) - would 
be an optimal arrangement that could enable member countries to tackle externalities 
and collective action problems associated with international migration. Although free 
movement and its multilateral governance are not high on governments’ policy 
agenda, they remain the most rational solutions to international migration problems in 
the age of globalisation coupled with persistence in international income inequalities.  
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Introduction 
 
After an alarmist reaction to perceived threat of mass migration in the early 1990s1
                                                          
1 For example, Martin (1993: 13) warns that ‘industrial countries are experiencing their highest ever 
levels of unwanted immigration, to which there is no end in sight.’ On the ‘securitization’ of 
immigration, see Heisler and Layton-Henry (1993). For a reaction from the perspective of developing 
countries, see Matheson (1991). 
, 
the policy debate on international migration is now going through a new phase. 
Although the official discourse is still coloured with a restrictive tone, implementation 
tends to reflect a degree of pragmatism in favour of ‘managed’ migration. There are 
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also a number of regional and international initiatives geared towards the development 
of regional/international frameworks that would facilitate the management of 
international migration. We aim to contribute to this relatively positive intellectual 
climate by exploring the ethical and economic case for free movement, which 
includes only the movement of people for employment purposes.2
 
  
The paper is organised in three sections. Section 1 examines the ethical case for and 
against free movement as defined above. In this section, we demonstrate that the level 
of analysis and the interdependence between actors at different levels are crucial 
issues that must be tackled by the ethical debate on free movement. Taking into 
account the consequences of strategic interaction between actors at the individual, 
national and global levels, we demonstrate that an ethical case against free movement 
cannot be made. Then, in section 2, we examine the impacts of international migration 
on national income, the labour market and fiscal balances of receiving countries. The 
theoretical and empirical findings suggests that international migration would have 
positive but small impacts on output, combined with some distributional effects that 
are in favour of capital but against the low-skilled section of the labour market. We 
conclude this section by arguing that the distributional effects can be tackled through 
compensation for the adversely-affected sections of the host country labour force, 
which can withstand the erosion of their wages only by investment in skill 
enhancement. Finally, in section 3, we propose a governance structure similar to that 
we observe in the area of trade. A World Migration Organisation (WMO), just like the 
WTO, must be based on three principles:  multilateralism, non-discrimination, and 
reciprocity. The conclusion highlights the main findings and discusses the feasibility 
of free movement as a policy option in the current political climate. 
 
                                                          
 
2 Asylum seekers or the movement of people in the context of trade in services are outside the remit of 
this paper. This is because these movements are subject to already existing rules and regulations, 
embodied in the UNHCR and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  
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1. Ethics and free movement  
 
In our attempt at examining the ethical case for and against free movement, we focus 
on the essential ingredients of the debate even though this narrow focus may cause 
injustice to the richness of the existing literature. We limit ourselves to evaluating the 
existing ethical propositions with reference to a utilitarian criterion. This utilitarian 
criterion is usually described as the social welfare of the host community and 
underpins the existing arguments against free movement. In that sense, our point of 
departure is the same as the ‘communitarian’ approach adopted by policy-makers as 
well as others arguing against free movement of workers. This point of departure 
yardstick is the maximisation of social welfare in the receiving country. The only 
difference between our understanding of social welfare and that of the 
‘communitarian’ approach is that, in the derivation of social welfare, we take account 
of the strategic interaction between actors at different levels. Specifically, we take 
account of interactions between individuals, groups and the government at the 
national level and between the latter and its counterparts at the international level.  
 
One implication of the strategic interaction is externalities, which draw a wedge 
between social welfare and the sum of individual/group welfares. In the case of 
negative externalities, some individuals or groups are able to influence public policy 
in their own favour without compensating other individuals/groups for the negative 
effects of the policy on the latter’s welfare.  (In the case of positive externalities, the 
champions of the policy are not compensated by those who stand to gain from the 
policy.) Let us explain the negative externality and its implications for 
individual/group and social welfares with an example of policy choice – say 
immigration restriction.  
 
The restriction of immigration may benefit some groups such as low-wage, low-skill 
labour or those with preferences in favour of a relatively more homogenous 
community. The same policy choice, however, may affect adversely the interests of 
other groups such as employers, high-skill segments of the labour market or those in 
favour of a more cosmopolitan community. Unless the winners from restrictive policy 
are made to compensate the losers, they would lobby for a level of restriction that is 
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higher than the socially-optimal level. This is mainly because they would not bear the 
full cost of the restrictive policy on society. Therefore, in the presence of negative 
externalities, immigration policy is highly likely to be over-restrictive – i.e., 
inefficient.  
 
The second implication of strategic interaction is what is referred to as collective 
action failures. According to (Olson, 1965), small groups are relatively better able to 
organise and lobby the policy-makers compared to large groups with diffused 
membership. There are two reasons for this type of collective action problem within 
large groups. First, the marginal contribution of a single member to the success of the 
lobbying process is small. Therefore, the perceived risk of group failure is small when  
the marginal member does not contribute. This encourages lower participation rates. 
Secondly, the benefits derived from successful lobbying are distributed among a large 
number of claimants. Therefore, in large groups, the expected benefits of active 
participation are small. Given these dynamics, small groups formed around an anti-
immigration objective may be more active and vociferous in their campaigns 
compared to large but diffused groups who may be in favour immigration. To the 
extent this is the case, immigration restriction will be not only inefficient but also 
unfair.  
 
The third implication of strategic interaction relates to the role of government. The 
realist/communitarian ethics tends to assume that the government is a social planner 
who maximises social welfare (or national interest) and that the legitimacy of its 
action is derived from popular consent.3
                                                          
3 A classic example of the realist work in international relations is Morgenthau (1960). Waltz (1979) 
provides a structural basis for political realism. For a state-centric critique of the realist/neo-realist 
approach on the basis of interdependence, see Keohane (1986). For a ‘globalist’ critique, see Linklater 
(1993). The realist approach to international migration is deeply rooted in international law. See, for 
example, Oppenheim (1905), Hendrickson (1992). For the application of political realism to 
international migration, see Weiner (1985, 1996). On the communitarian perspective, see Sandel (1982) 
and Walzer (1988). 
  Then, it is ethical to restrict immigration if 
the latter is perceived to be posing a threat to the national interests. This proposition, 
however, is problematic because the government may be motivated by electoral 
considerations rather than social welfare. In addition, the government of a migrant-
receiving country may adopt a restrictive policy without taking into account the affect 
of its action on other countries. In fact, this criticism constitutes the core argument of 
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the natural law or egalitarian liberalist approach to immigration.4
 
  According to the 
latter, the unit of analysis should be the world itself rather than nation states or 
communities.  
In what follows, we will try to ascertain whether it is ethical to: (i) restrict 
immigration given the implications of strategic interaction summarised above; and (ii) 
to discriminate between movements of people and goods and/or capital.  To do this, 
we will examine the propositions in favour of restriction as formulated by the 
libertarian and communitarian/realist ethics. We will also assess the coherence of the 
counter-propositions as put forward by the students of natural law and egalitarian 
liberalism. 
 
1.1 The ethics of restriction 
 
1.1.1 The libertarian perspective 
 
The libertarian ethics is based on individual sovereignty, the most explicit 
manifestation of which is the individual’s ability to enjoy the benefits of private 
property and of the associations formed with like-minded individuals. This premise 
has two conflicting implications for free movement of people. On the one hand, it 
implies that sovereign individuals are entitled to free movement, subject to limitations 
that can be justified on security and public order grounds. On the other hand, 
however, it also implies that sovereign individuals are entitled to object to free 
movement if the latter is perceived to threaten their property rights and/or the ‘club 
benefits’ they derive from associations they voluntarily establish with like-minded 
individuals. In practice, the libertarian approach is in favour of immigration if the 
latter follows an invitation from sovereign individuals or a contract between two 
parties. Otherwise, immigration amounts to trespassing.5
 
  
                                                          
4 For the liberal-egalitarian case in favour of taking international society as the unit of analysis, see 
Linklater (1993), Carens (1987) and Goodin (1988). For the case for open borders from a natural law 
perspective, see Dummet (1992) and Weithman (1992).  
 
5 For a libertarian approach based on individual sovereignty, see Steiner (1992). On the case for capital 
mobility as opposed to free movement of labour, see Lal (1992). For a critique, see O’Neill (1992). 
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However, property rights is a poor basis for restricting the movement of people for 
three reasons. First, and as indicated by O’Neill (1992), the right to own and enjoy 
private property cannot be separated from the way in which the property was 
appropriated originally. If the original appropriation was based on closure or 
expropriation, people whose movements are restricted could well argue that the 
current income inequalities are a result of closure or expropriation. This is an 
argument likely to be voiced by developing country governments, who would argue 
that colonisation by developed countries between the seventeenth and twentieth 
centuries constituted an exercise in expropriation. Then, restriction of immigration on 
the basis of property rights could be justified only if developed countries compensated 
developing countries thorough development aid.  
 
Secondly, and from natural law perspective, it can be argued that private property is a 
historical construct and was not a universal right before the emergence of capitalism. 
Therefore, the property rights argument can be criticised as an attempt at restricting a 
historically-prior right (i.e., the right to free movement) by upholding a historically-
posterior right (i.e., the right to own property). Thirdly, the libertarian approach does 
not address the possibility of externalities and collective action problems indicated 
above. In other words, it does not allow for possible conflicts between the 
maximisation of individual welfare and that of the social welfare. 
 
Finally, the libertarian ethics does not address adequately the issues that arise because 
of the existence of a ‘public space’ outside the realm of private property. For example, 
the delivery of essential public services such as health, education, or social care may 
require the employment of foreign labour even if the latter is considered as a source of 
threat to the ‘club benefits’ associated with membership of the host community. The 
libertarian ethics suggests that a ‘congestion criterion’ can be applied to determine 
whether or not the entry of foreign labour is justified. However, congestion is not a 
robust criterion because its definition varies. Congestion sometimes refers to the level 
of unemployment among the native work force; sometimes it is the pressure that 
foreigners exert on local services; and sometimes it is the exceeding of a threshold in 
the ethnic mixture of the local/national community. In addition, even if we agree on 
any of these measures of congestion, the measure in question is influenced by 
perceptions that change over time and from one community to the other.  
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In the light of the analysis above, we can detect two major shortcomings in the 
libertarian ethics of free movement. First, the libertarian ethics may leave no scope for 
international migration when the latter is perceived to be encroaching on individual 
property rights or when it is perceived to congest the public space. In practice, this 
may imply zero immigration – depending on societal perceptions and the 
organisational strength of the anti-immigration lobbies. Then, the libertarian argument 
in favour of international migration (subject to preservation of existing property rights 
or ‘club benefits’) becomes morally obnoxious because it boils down to granting a 
right that may not be exercised. Indeed, the libertarian ethics could generate 
propositions that are more exclusionary than the realist/communitarian approach and 
foster open hostility between defenders of the existing property rights (i.e., 
incumbents) and trespassers (i.e., immigrants).  
 
The second shortcoming is the high levels of uncertainty and discretion that the 
libertarian ethics would allow for in the determination of congestion thresholds. For 
example, what is the acceptable level of ethnic diversity in the host country? To what 
extent is the pressure on local services due to extra demand by foreigners and not to 
tax cuts induced by high levels of capital mobility? To what extent are unemployment 
and wage differentials due to other variables such as free trade, technological change 
or capital mobility rather than immigration?  Finally, how should the policy-maker 
react to the diverse and sometimes conflicting perceptions about congestion?  
 
1.1.2 The realist perspective  
 
The realist arguments against free movement take two forms, both of which ignore the 
interaction between actors at different levels. One variant, described as 
communitarianism, is based on the premise that moral agents are rooted in particular 
contexts as people choose different ways of life and organise into different 
communities (Sandel, 1982; Walzer, 1983; and Kymlicka, 1988). Therefore, people 
are entitled to be protected against international migration that threatens their ways of 
life and association. In addition, popular sovereignty implies that states are under 
obligation to prioritise the interests of their political community vis-à-vis other 
individual or collective claims. Realists acknowledge that this stance inevitably 
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implies exclusion, but they also argue that this exclusion would in fact be less severe 
than the exclusion that non-state actors, left to their own devises, are likely to impose 
(Walzer, 1983: 39).  
 
The other realist variant is based on national interest as articulated by governments. 
For example, Weiner (1985 and 1996) argues that free movement of people or 
international regimes for regulating international migration are not feasible because 
sovereign states can always invoke the concept of national interest as a basis for 
unilateral action. Then, we should be guided by the ethical requirement that ‘ought 
implies can’. In other words, it is better not to have ethical norms if such norms are 
not likely to be observed. Weiner (1996: 193) also differentiates between individual 
morality and the application of morality to public policy. Based on this differentiation, 
he argues that ‘[P]ersonal ethics are a poor basis for public choices because they do 
not take into account the costs that such policies impose upon others.’  
 
As a basis for restricting immigration, the realist/communitarian ethics suffers from 
three shortcomings. The first is the ignorance of externalities that arise when 
governments adopt unilateral immigration policies. Just as it is the case with the 
libertarian ethics criticised by Weiner above, the realist/communitarian ethics can be 
criticised for ignoring the costs that national policy choices might impose on other 
nations.6
 
 True, realists are not against intergovernmental institutions that could 
mitigate or manage the spill-over effects of unilateral actions. Yet, they leave such 
institution building to the discretion of nation states, which would prefer either 
unilateral action or rules/institutions that would be too loose to be effective. So, the 
realist qualification concerning intergovernmental cooperation provides very little or 
no remedy to the externalities that may be associated with unilateral national action.  
The second problem is that the negation of ‘ought implies can’ is not ‘cannot implies 
ought not’ (Goodin, 1992: 252). An action that would produce a superior outcome 
compared to the existing state of affairs may well be unfeasible. As Goodin indicates, 
however, ‘the good remains good, even when it lies beyond our grasp.’ Then, the 
realist approach cannot justify restrictions on international migration merely by 
                                                          
6 On this, see for example Keohane and Nye (1977). 
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pointing to the practical impossibility caused by the division of the world into 
sovereign state jurisdictions. It would be still ethically correct to argue in favour of 
free movement, not only because one has to be logically consistent but also because 
one has to call a spade a spade – i.e., one has to highlight the fact that the existing 
order is preventing the achievement of a superior outcome. Otherwise, the 
realist/communitarian proposition will boil down either to ‘excuses’ in defence of the 
existing order or to collusion with dominant actors in that order. 
 
The third problem stems from the possibility of ‘veto groups’ within national 
communities and the impact of these groups on national and global welfare. Veto 
groups are likely to emerge when: (i) the group size is small; and (ii) the benefits to be 
derived from common group action are large (Olson, 1965). Therefore, the larger the 
number of veto groups in a country, the higher the probability of sub-optimal policy 
choices. In addition, the ability of veto groups to impose sub-optimal policy choices 
will increase to the extent that the group can equate its own interests with the national 
interest that the state is expected to defend against non-nationals (see, Ugur, 1995). 
Unless it demonstrates that these complications do not exist, the realist approach 
cannot provide an ethical basis for rejecting free movement.  
 
1.1.3. The natural law and egalitarian perspectives 
 
The natural law or egalitarian approaches to the ethics of international migration try to 
overcome the shortcomings indicated above by focusing on global society or 
humanity. For example, the natural law approach argues that one’s rights arise from 
one’s being human – as opposed to being a citizen or a member of a community. The 
egalitarian approach, on the other hand, seeks a just distribution of wealth within a 
global society. Therefore, according to the natural law approach, ‘any legal or 
political arrangement in which citizens have rights which aliens do not have’ is unjust 
and in contradiction to natural law (Finnis, 1992: 205. See also Dummett, 1992). The 
liberal egalitarian approach, on the other hand, considers free movement as a human 
right comparable with other rights, and the exercise of this right is necessary to reduce 
global inequality (Carens, 1992: 25; Woodward, 1992: 60). 
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The strength of these arguments stems from their non-contingent nature, which leaves 
little or no room for discretion or uncertainty. Yet, the natural law and liberal 
egalitarian approaches too ignore the implications of strategic interaction between 
actors (governments, individuals, groups) at different levels. For example, there is 
evidence suggesting that economic convergence between nations reduces while 
economic inequality increases the incentives to migrate. Then, the number of people 
exercising the right to free movement would fall as inter-country and inter-group 
equality increases. This is unlike the right to free speech, for example. The exercise of 
the latter not only contributes to achievement of equality but also becomes more 
feasible as equality increases. In other words, there is a symbiotic relationship 
between the right granted and the common good (equality) that it is expected to serve.  
 
Therefore, the natural law and liberal egalitarian approaches must accept that free 
movement is not a basic right but only an instrument that could enable individuals to 
escape inequality. If this is the case, then the effectiveness of this instrument should 
be compared with that of others (e.g., free trade or free capital mobility) that may also 
alleviate inequality through convergence of wages and other factor incomes. In short, 
free movement of people may not be considered as a basic human right but only as a 
policy choice, which, preferably, should satisfy ethical and efficiency criteria.  
 
Furthermore, free movement of people should be presented as a basic right only if it 
can be demonstrated that the exercise of this right does not harm others. All human 
rights have a ‘public good’ character in that the exercise of these rights does not 
reduce the amounts of rights available to others with legitimate claims. Neither free 
movement of people nor that of goods and capital satisfies this condition. All these so-
called rights have redistributive effects that generate winners and losers, even though 
their exercise may lead to an increase in global welfare. Therefore, the ethicality of 
the free movement cannot be established on the basis of whether or not it constitutes a 
basic right.  We can still develop an ethical argument in favour of free movement 
because the domain of what is ethical (i.e., right to do) is larger than the domain of 
basic rights (i.e., rights to enjoy). 
 
The analysis above enables us to argue that neither libertarianism nor political realism 
can provide an ethical basis for restrictive immigration policies. Both approaches 
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ignore the possibility that restrictive policies may not serve the common good (i.e., 
they may not lead to the maximisation of social welfare) within the countries that 
adopt them. Also, both approaches are conducive to a high level of discretion and 
uncertainty either in the internalisation of externalities or in the management of 
international migration. Therefore, we conclude that that neither libertarian nor 
realist/communitarian ethics can be invoked against free movement 
 
However, the analysis above also suggests that the ethical case in favour of free 
movement cannot be based on its conceptualisation as a basic right. Yet, the 
impossibility of conceptualising the free movement of people as a basic right does not 
imply that an ethical case for free movement cannot be made. Free movement can still 
be ethical because the domain of what is ethical (i.e., right to do) is larger than the 
domain of basic rights (i.e., rights to enjoy). 
 
 
1.2 The ethics of asymmetric treatment 
 
The inadequacy of the ethical debate concerning free movement is also apparent in the 
debate on whether it is ethical treat the free movement of people and that of 
goods/capital asymmetrically. On the one hand, the liberal egalitarian and natural law 
approaches argue that both types of movement should be treated symmetrically. Their 
argument derives from their assumption that free movement is a basic right. This is 
explicit in the case of free movement of people, but it is implicit in the case of free 
movement of goods and capital. In that sense, the natural law and liberal egalitarian 
approaches appear to be avoiding inconsistency at the expense of subscribing to a 
questionable characterisation of free movement as a basic right. 
 
The libertarian approach engages in a different trade-off. It refrains from discussing 
whether or not free movement of people is a basic right, but accepts explicitly that this 
is different from free movement of goods and capital. That is because the latter would 
result only from voluntary contracts concluded prior to the movement itself; whereas 
people can move between countries with or without prior contracts. The problem here 
is that this classification is based on questionable criteria. For example, the existence 
or lack of prior contracts may well be related to whether or not governments are 
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permitting a market in which migrant workers can contract freely with potential 
employers. If such a market existed, migrants would prefer to secure an employment 
contract before they migrate to another country. For example, in the 1960s, almost all 
Turkish migrants secured such contracts before they left for Germany. The ratio of 
illegal to legal migrants tended to increase significantly afterwards, when securing 
such contracts was prevented by restrictive government policy. Therefore, the 
libertarian approach cannot justify the asymmetric treatment of the free movement of 
people on the basis of whether or not prior contracts exist. 
 
Another problem with the libertarian asymmetric treatment is that it introduces ad hoc 
criteria in addition to the classification criterion mentioned above. For example Lal 
(1992) appears to be suggesting efficiency and feasibility criteria. He argues that 
restricting the movement of capital may be unethical because restriction impairs 
economic efficiency or because it would be ineffective given the extent to which 
national boundaries have been eroded. This shifting basis for asymmetric treatment 
suggests that the ‘objectivity’ of the criteria for discrimination becomes even more 
questionable. In addition, it raises the question as to whether or not restrictions on the 
movement of people could also be inefficient and ineffective.  
 
The lack of a coherent basis for asymmetric treatment is a problem in the realist 
approach too. Realism justifies asymmetric treatment by reference to national interest, 
which is characterised by two features. First, it is defended and maximised by the 
state. Second, the variable maximised differs from one state to the other because it 
depends on the position of the state in the international system (see, Goodin, 1992b: 
257). One implication here is that asymmetric treatment is justified if states consider 
free movement of people as a threat to their national interest. The other implication is 
that one should not expect all states to treat free movement of people in the same way: 
some states may be more or less restrictive than others. Put differently, the realist 
logic can be invoked to justify any act of discrimination between people and 
money/capital - either over time or across countries. Then, realism cannot be relied 
upon to provide a yardstick with which one can distinguish between necessity and 
political convenience.  
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This problem is exacerbated by the non-quantifiable nature of the threats to the 
national interests. For example, realists draw attention to the impact of international 
migration on racial mix in the receiving country. Yet, they do not provide a consistent 
measure of how such change is going to harm the national interest. Communitarians 
refer to the threat posed by immigrants to existing values and norms; whereas 
conventional realists refer to security risks. However, the measures of such 
risks/threats are time- and ideology-dependent. In addition, there is no convincing 
evidence suggesting that countries of immigration have been subject to higher 
risks/threats because of immigration rather than other factors (e.g., past or current 
foreign policy preferences). All we have is tautologies such as the following: that 
‘admitting new people … will inevitably change the society’ (Barry, 1992: 286); that 
any country that opens its borders ‘may soon find other states taking advantage of its 
beneficent policy’ (Weiner, 1996: 173); or that different people are entitled to lead 
their own different ways of life without undue influence form others. One can hardly 
rely on such speculations to justify asymmetric treatment. 
 
1.3 The ethical case for free movement of people: a proposition 
 
The analysis above suggests that the existing literature does not provide a coherent 
ethical basis for the argument against or in favour of free movement. We can avoid 
this shortcoming by defining what is ethical and proposing a measure to verify it. We 
define ethical as a quality, which implies ‘right to do’ rather than a ‘right’ to exercise. 
The measure that would be used to decide whether or not an action is ‘right to do’ is 
the impact of the action on social welfare, understood as the sum of individual/group 
welfare under strategic interaction between governments and individuals. If this 
specification is accepted, free movement of people can be considered as a policy 
choice rather than a basic right; and its ethicality can be derived from its positive 
impact on social welfare.  
 
Here, social welfare is taken as the main variable to observe not because it is 
necessarily an ethical concept, but because it is the concept that all approaches to 
international migration invoke when they refer to the interests of the community (e.g., 
communitarians, realists.) of to the interests of individuals that constitute a 
community (libertarians and natural/law egalitarian approaches). Put differently, we 
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take the concerns of all approaches about the impact of international migration on the 
host community at face value and use the concept of social welfare as the context 
within which the impact can be measured.  
 
Free movement can be expected to increase social welfare in receiving countries for 
three reasons. First, free movement enables receiving countries to avoid direct 
exclusion costs. Direct exclusion costs are welfare-reducing because they result from 
non-productive activities such as increased border controls, increased costs of 
monitoring immigrants within the country, and increased cost of enforcement. These 
costs will tend to increase as the world economy becomes more integrated, 
globalisation becomes a dominant trend, inter-country inequality increases, and 
governments tend to be more receptive to exclusion demands. In addition, some of the 
factors that increase the exclusion costs (e.g., globalisation, market integration, etc.) 
would also reduce the effectiveness of exclusion. Therefore, exclusion costs are 
welfare-reducing not only because they result from non-productive activities, but also 
because exclusion becomes less effective as it absorbs more resources. Free 
movement will be ethical because it will enable receiving countries to avoid ‘absolute 
waste’.  
 
The second reason why free movement would be ethical relates to indirect costs of 
exclusion. A restrictive policy provides perverse incentives to citizens. For example, it 
perpetuates labour market rigidities as it strengthens the veto groups, who would 
deliberately confuse the equality of employment opportunities with entitlement to 
employment. In addition, restrictive policies prevent competition and reduce the 
incentives for skill enhancement and investment in human capital by the incumbent 
work force. Finally, restrictive policies increase the probability of illegal employment 
and, thereby, provide perverse incentives to employers to be less concerned with 
productivity-increasing capital investment. Taken together, these perverse incentives 
will have a negative effect on social welfare - by discouraging investment, 
competition, and qualification. Free movement, coupled with the principle of equal 
treatment with nationals, can enable receiving countries to avoid such consequences 
by inducing employers and incumbent employees to engage in productivity-increasing 
investment.  
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The third reason why free movement would be an ethical policy choice can be 
deduced from its relative efficiency in stabilising the flows of migration. The existing 
evidence suggests that restrictions are largely inefficient in curbing the flow of 
migrants from countries with low wages and employment opportunities to countries 
with high wages and employment opportunities. The cases of the US-Mexican border 
and the continuing increase in the number of illegal immigrants in the European 
Union are well known facts in this context.  
 
Free movement is generally perceived as a recipe for unlimited flows of migrants 
from less developed to developed countries. Yet, the EU experience concerning free 
movement demonstrates that this is not the case. The number of Italian, Greek, 
Spanish or Portuguese workers within other EU countries did not register a sudden 
increase after their entitlement to free movement. In fact, the number of the citizens of 
the new member states registered a relative decline not only in comparison to 
historical trend but also in comparison to third-country citizens who were subject to 
strict restrictions (ILO, 1990; Ugur, 1999: 134).  
 
One important reason for this trend was the fact that free movement removed the 
premium on ‘border jumping’ as a source of advantage and increased the probability 
of decisions based on the probability of employment in the destination country. In 
other words, free movement encouraged potential migrants to act in accordance with 
the signals about employment opportunities and wage levels in the destination 
countries. This is in contrast to taking high risks with the anticipation that entry into a 
closed market in itself would ensure sufficient compensation. In short, given reduced 
cost of entry and exit under free movement, migration will cease to be a one-way bet. 
In addition, the demand for labour in the destination countries will be a more 
significant determinant of migratory flows into and out of the developed countries.  
 
On the basis of this analysis, we can argue that free movement of people would be an 
ethical policy choice because it can increase social welfare by: (i) challenging the 
existing individual or group privileges that cannot be justified on the basis of 
objective criteria such as productivity or performance; (ii) encouraging welfare-
improving reforms in receiving countries; and (iii) inducing a self-regulatory dynamic 
that is conducive to manageable levels of migration. The task in the next section is to 
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ascertain the extent to which the existing research on the economics of international 
migration supports these conclusions.  
 
 
2. The economics of free movement 
 
In this section, we examine the findings of the economics literature on international 
migration. The aim here is to provide an empirical underpinning to the ethical 
conclusions derived above. We first examine the theoretical findings in section 2.1 
and then the empirical evidence in section 2.2.  
 
2.1 Theoretical findings on international migration  
 
Attempts at formal modelling of migration date back to Harris and Todaro (1970). 
Focusing on rural-urban migration in a developing country, Harris and Todaro 
demonstrated that migration can lead to improvement in welfare as it eliminates 
labour misallocation between regions. The improvement in welfare will be larger the 
larger is the wage differential between receiving and sending regions. Harris and 
Todaro also demonstrated that migration will increase as wages and employment 
opportunities in destination regions increase; but it will decline as wages in regions of 
origin and the cost of migration increase.  
 
An important refinement to the model has been introduced by Borjas (1987b). Using 
Roy’s (1951) model of income distribution, Borjas argued that migration models must 
take into account the extent of self-selection. Self-selection arises because migration 
is not a random process. A migrant makes two decisions before migrating: (i) the 
decision to leave his/her country; and (ii) the decision to go to country A rather than 
B. Self-selection may be involved in both decisions because not all potential migrants 
emigrate and the distribution of income in the origin and destination countries can 
influence the type of migrants.  
 
Borjas identifies two main types of self-selection. Positive selection occurs when only 
people with earnings higher than average income in the country of origin emigrate. 
These migrants are likely to be characterised by high skill levels and will move to 
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countries where income distribution is widely dispersed – i.e., the variance of the 
income distribution is large. That is because a widely dispersed income distribution in 
the destination country signals to potential migrants that there is a good association 
between income and skill distributions and that the probability of rewarding high 
skills is high. The widely-dispersed income distribution can also be interpreted to 
suggest a destination country where the probability of low earnings or that of 
remaining unemployed is high unless the immigrant has high skills. Negative 
selection, on the other hand, occurs when potential migrants have lower skills and 
earn less than employees with comparable skills in both home and destination 
countries. In this case, these migrants will move to a country where income 
distribution has a relatively lower variance. That is because the low-variance (i.e., the 
more equitable income distribution) would signal to potential migrants that the risk of 
remaining unemployed or earning low income is small.  
 
These findings by Borjas (1987b) do not suggest that international migration is 
conducive to lower social welfare. All they suggest is that self-selection may dampen 
the positive impact of international migration on social welfare and/or exacerbates its 
impact on earnings as well as employment probability of the low-skilled native 
workers. Yet, Borjas’ findings provide significant insights as to why some policy-
makers would be inclined to restrict free movement.  On the one hand, negative 
selection would lead to a flood of low-skill labour, which would cause the overall skill 
level to deteriorate. On the other hand, negative selection implies that income equality 
in the receiving country is a liability rather than an asset. That is because the more 
egalitarian a country is, the more likely it is to attract immigrants with low skills.  
 
Although such theoretical possibilities strike a chord with anti-immigrant views held 
within the low-skill segments of the labour market, they can be questioned on a 
number of grounds. First, negative selection becomes less of a problem if labour 
shortages in the destination country are felt in the low-skill segments of the labour 
market. Secondly, a strictly implemented ‘equal treatment’ principle will work in 
favour of the workers in the destination country. That is because equal treatment in 
terms of wages and other employment-related benefits is likely to counter-balance any 
employer bias in favour of immigrants with similar skills to incumbents. Finally, 
Borjas’ theoretical findings are not supported by empirical evidence. For example 
18 
 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) test Borjas’ negative selection hypothesis and finds out 
that: (i) Mexican immigrants into the United States may be less educated than US 
natives, but they are on average more educated than residents of Mexico; and (ii) the 
wages of Mexican immigrants would have occupied the middle and upper segments 
of the Mexican wage distribution had they remained in Mexico and been paid in 
accordance with current skill prices there.  
 
These findings suggest that negative selection may be a theoretical possibility, but it is 
not inevitable. True, one can argue that the absence of negative selection in the case of 
Mexican migrants in the US could be due to dispersed income distribution in the 
latter. Such arguments, however, would fail to explain the absence of negative 
selection within the European Union. There is no evidence suggesting that free 
movement within the EU has attracted mainly low-skill migrants from relatively less 
developed member states such as Greece or Portugal into more developed member 
states with high levels of income equality. If anything, free movement has generally 
led to increased mobility by high-skill workers across the EU.  
 
Another refinement to the Harris-Todaro model concerns the assumption about the 
level of employment in the receiving country. The original model assumed 
employment in the receiving country to be variable. Ghatak et al (1996: 168-172), 
however, draws attention to the consequences of migration when employment in the 
receiving country is taken as constant. Under this assumption, migration is sub-
optimal from the perspectives of individual migrants and society in general. That is 
because every additional migrant is increasing the probability of unemployment in the 
destination country. As the probability of unemployment increases, the costs borne by 
those employed in the destination country (whether migrants or natives) will be higher 
than the benefits accruing to the additional migrant at the margin.  
 
However, the constant employment assumption can and should be questioned for two 
reasons. First, if migrants are complementary to incumbent labour, they increase the 
productivity of  the latter. This will lead to an increase in the demand for labour at 
current real wages. Secondly, if migrants are substitutes to incumbent labour, they 
would lead to fall in real wages and an increase in the demand for labour. So, 
irrespective of whether immigrant labour is complementary or substitute to incumbent 
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labour, there is scope for an increase in the demand for labour in the destination 
country.  
 
The only qualification that can be made here concerns the distributional effects of 
migration. If the distribution of skills within the migrant population is similar to skill 
distribution in the destination country, there will be no distributional effects within the 
labour force but there will be redistribution from labour in general towards capital. If 
the distribution of migrant skills is biased towards low-skills, there will be a re-
distribution effect within the labour force as well as between labour and capital 
(Borjas et al., 1997: 3).  
 
The brief review above suggests that international migration is conducive to improved 
global welfare under standard assumptions. In fact, welfare improvement would be 
possible (albeit dampened) even if full wage convergence does not occur or negative 
selection proves to be the case. Therefore, at the theoretical level, there is no 
economic case against free movement of people. Yet, the review also suggests that 
international migration is likely to have inter-group or intra-group distributional 
effects. Given the overall improvement in social welfare, however, these distributional 
effects cannot be used to support an argument against free movement of people.  
 
 
2.2 Empirical findings on international migration 
 
In this section, I will examine the findings of the empirical literature concerning the 
impact of migration on GDP and native work force earnings, the labour market, and 
fiscal balances. I must indicate at the outset that not all of the findings reported below 
are based on a free movement scenario. Even those based on a free movement 
scenario are related only to the EU and the US. Therefore, they cannot be taken as 
definite indicators of the costs and benefits of free movement at a global level. 
Nevertheless, these findings are still pertinent because they are in line with the 
predictions of the theoretical model discussed above – which assumes free movement 
and delineates the implications accordingly.  
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2.2.1 Migration and GDP 
 
Brücker (2002: 7) provides simulation results for the European Union, using a one-
good model of a closed economy and with different scenarios concerning labour 
market characteristics and composition of migrants. One of his findings is based on 
the assumptions that the labour market remains in equilibrium, manual workers 
account for 70% of immigrants, and the share of immigrant labour in total workforce 
increases by 1%. Under this scenario, total GDP in the host country increases by 
0.7%. Of this, only 0.006% accrue to native workers, with the remaining increase in 
GDP accruing to capital. Similar distributional effect is also found by Borjas (1987a).  
 
Brücker (2002) also considers the scenario where the labour market does not clear. 
Under this scenario, and assuming that the wage elasticity of the demand for labour is 
-0.4 for manual workers and -1.0 for non-manual workers7
 
, the increase in the host 
country GDP is nearly halved to 0.39%. Although the change in GDP is still positive, 
rigid labour markets lead to a fall of -0.22% in total income of the native work force. 
The increase in GDP would be slightly higher if the sensitivity of the demand for 
labour to the change in wages increases – i.e., if the labour market becomes more 
flexible.  
Borjas et al. (1997: 19, 44) provide some simulation results for the US. For example, 
change in total native earnings due to immigration in the 1980-95 period amounted to 
an increase of about 0.05 % of the 1995 GDP if the quantity of capital adjusts. The 
increase in native earnings would be higher, at 0.13% of the 1995 GDP, if capital is 
assumed to be fixed. However, these findings are based on the assumption that all 
workers within a skill group are perfect substitutes. If complementarity exists, the 
gains will be higher. Another finding in Borjas et al. (1997) is that immigration would 
have a negative impact on a small group of the least educated US native workers, who 
constituted 12.7% of those aged 18-64 in 1995.  
 
                                                          
7 The assumption concerning wage semi-elasticity is based on a number of studies that found that this 
parameter ranges between 0.4 and 1.1. See, for example, Layard et al (1991). 
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These findings suggest that free movement is highly likely to have a positive effect on 
social welfare in the receiving countries, even though the magnitude of the welfare 
gains is small – most probably less than 1% of GDP. Then, the policy implication is 
that a restrictive immigration policy cannot be justified on the grounds that 
immigration is welfare-reducing. In fact, one can make a case in favour of free 
movement under different assumptions about labour market flexibility, capital 
adjustment, and the extent of substitution or complementarity between immigrants 
and native workers. This case requires only attention to distributional consequences of 
migration, which are small and can be addressed more effectively through 
compensation and incentives for skill enhancement.  
 
2.2.2 Migration and the labour market 
 
As far as the impact of migration on the labour market is concerned, the following 
findings can be listed.  
 
In his work on migration into West Germany, Smolny (1991) reports that migration 
had positive effects on employment and alleviated labour demand pressure on wage 
and price inflation. This is confirmed by Chiswick, Chiswick and Karras (1992), who 
found that immigration had a positive long-term effect through capital deepening and 
rising native incomes. Similarly, Straubhaar and Weber (1994) found that this was the 
case for Switzerland. In their work on Australia, Withers and Pope (1983) and Pope 
and Withers (1993) reported that immigration did not contribute to the level or risk of 
unemployment.  
 
These findings are in line with that of Borjas et al. (1997), who report that a 10 
percentage point increase in relative number of immigrants reduces the employment-
to-population ratio of the natives only by 0.45 percentage point. In addition, any 
negative impact was diffused across the country. Borjas et al. (1997: 18) also report 
on the combined effect that trade and immigration might have had on wage 
differentials between high- and low-skill US workers. The combined effect of trade 
and migration accounts for less than 10% of the increase in the wage differential. 
Other factors, such as ‘acceleration of skill-biased technological change, a slow down 
in the growth of the relative supply of college graduates, and institutional changes in 
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the labour market’, etc. are likely to be more important in explaining the widening 
wage differential since the late 1970s.  
 
These findings enable us to put the distributional effects of international migration 
into context. Even though free movement is likely to have some distributional effects 
on the incumbent labour force, the effect will be small and only a minority of the 
incumbent workers (specifically, the low-skilled workers) will be affected adversely. 
In addition, the adverse distributional effect of international migration accounts only 
for a small part of the relative decline in the earnings of the less-skilled labour. The 
major causes of the relative decline have been either technological change or labour 
market flexibility, both of which had been embraced and encouraged by governments 
of destination countries.   
 
A report by the European Integration Consortium (2000) provides similar insights into 
the likely consequences of free movement within an enlarged European Union. 
Focusing on Austria and Germany, the two countries that are expected to attract a 
disproportional share of the migrants from new member states, the Consortium’s Final 
Report (2000: 130) states the following: ‘Against the background of empirical 
knowledge on the labour impact of migration, the projected flows and stocks of 
migrants will affect neither wages nor employment in the host countries strongly. … 
One should recall that an increase of the foreigner share in one branch by one 
percentage point reduced wages by 0.25 per cent in Austria and 0.65 per cent in 
Germany. The risk of unemployment is increased by 0.8 per cent in Austria and 0.2 
per cent in Germany.’  
 
Brücker (2002) reports that manual wages would fall by 1.05% and non-manual 
wages would increase by 0.18% if the share of immigrants in the labour force 
increases by 1% and if we assume clearing labour markets.  If the labour market does 
not clear (and assuming a semi-elasticity of wages of -0.4 for manual and -1.0 for 
non-manual workers) manual wages would fall by 0.48%, non-manual wages would 
fall by 0.19%, manual unemployment would increases by 0.85% and non-manual 
unemployment would increases by 0.05%. Brücker also finds that wages of the native 
work force fall slightly more as the replacement ratio (the ratio of unemployment 
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benefits to post-tax wage) increases. Wages fall by 0.6% when the replacement ratio 
is 20%, by 0.67 when the replacement ratio is 40% and by 0.73% when it is 60%.  
 
Finally, ten empirical studies cited by Brücker (2002: 20) reflect similar results. Nine 
out of the ten studies show that ‘… a 1% increase in the labour force through 
migration yields a change in native wages in a range … between -0.3% and +0.3%.’ 
These empirical studies also report that individual unemployment risks increase in a 
range between zero and 0.2%.  
 
The empirical findings cited above enables us to derive a number of conclusions about 
the impact of migration on the labour markets of receiving countries. First, the 
negative effects of immigration on wages and employment of the low-skill labour are 
small – i.e., less than 1%. In addition, the impact of immigration may be significantly 
less than that of other factors such as technological change. Secondly, the negative 
effects of migration tend to increase as labour market rigidity increases. In other 
words, labour market institutions may be a more significant determinant of the 
negative effect compared to the characteristics (e.g., skill composition) of the 
immigrant labour. A study by Angrist and Kugler (2003) also confirms this 
conclusion and highlights product market imperfections as another source of adverse 
effects on wages and employment. Thirdly, the most severe distributional 
consequences of immigration would affect only a small minority of the native work 
force. Nevertheless, we should not ignore the fact that the earning capacity of this 
minority is already low. Therefore, the case in favour of free movement must be 
accompanied with an incentive-compatible compensation scheme that would 
compensate the low-skill labour and induce it to invest in skill enhancement at the 
same time.  
 
2.2.3 Migration and fiscal balances  
 
Another impact of immigration concerns fiscal balances. Quoting Bonin (2001) and 
Bonin et al (1999) on Germany, Brücker (2002: 27) reports that the effect of migrants 
on public finance is positive. Net tax payments (i.e., the balance between tax 
payments and social security transfers plus government expenditures) are positive 
over the remaining life cycle of immigrants who immigrate at ages 11-48 years. At 
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present, around 78 per cent of the immigrants belong to cohorts that contribute to a 
budget surplus. Taken all together, the net contribution of a representative immigrant 
over the life cycle is around Euros 50,000. These findings are parallel to those of 
Storeslette (2003), who finds that the net present value of the positive contribution of 
a young working immigrant to Swedish public finances is US$23,500. This is larger 
than the loss incurred as a result of admitting a new immigrant, which is US$20,500. 
The break-even participation rate (i.e., the employment rate at which the gain to 
public finances is zero) is 60%, which is well below the empirical rate for this group. 
One should bear in mind the migrant’s positive contribution to the Swedish public 
finances is realised despite the fact that Sweden has one of the most comprehensive 
welfare states. These findings demonstrate the lack of a credible basis for perceptions 
that portray immigrants as a drain on public finances.  
 
As can be seen from the account above, the findings of the empirical research on the 
welfare implications of migration are in line with the predictions of theoretical models 
of free movement. In addition, these findings suggest that policy-makers in receiving 
countries do not actually have an economically justifiable reason to take a stance 
against free movement. From the perspective of policy making in destination 
countries, the only qualification that can be advanced against free movement is the 
following: there is need for a compensation scheme that would reduce the cost of 
immigration for a minority section of the labour force and induce this section to invest 
in skill enhancement.  
 
 
3. The governance of free movement 
 
Free movement is often equated with massive influx of ‘foreigners’ into developed 
countries. Even those who are relatively less concerned about such an influx express 
concern about the long-term effects of continuing migration on the ethnic composition 
of the population in host countries. Yet, the European Union’s (EU’s) experience in 
free movement of people since 1968 suggests that such concerns may not be 
warranted. As indicated above, neither the number of Greeks nor that of the 
Portuguese has increased at alarming rates after the gradual introduction of free 
movement in the EU. It can be argued that low rates of increase in intra-EU migration 
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have been due to relatively small per capita income differentials between the 
developed and less developed members of the EU. Equipped with this argument, 
some policy-makers and the media in developed EU members have drawn our 
attention to the flood of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that would 
occur after accession.  
 
Yet, these alarmist predictions are not supported by estimates that are open to 
verification. For example, the European Integration Consortium (2000: 121-126) 
reports that the rate of increase in the number of CEE migrants is likely to be (and 
remain) modest after the introduction of free movement. Focusing on Germany, the 
report estimates that the number of migrants from CEE will grow at around 220,000 
persons initially. Then the number will fall to 96,000 by 2010. The stock of migrants 
from CEE is estimated to reach 1.9 million in 2010, 2.4 million in 2020 and 2.5 
million in 2030. This implies that the share of CEE migrants in German population 
will increase from 0.6% in 1998 to 3.5% in 2030. This baseline scenario is based on 
the assumption that per capita GDP in CEE will converge towards the EU average at a 
rate of 2% per year.  
 
These results are then extrapolated to EU-15, based on the baseline scenario indicated 
above and the distribution of CEE migrants within the EU. The Report indicates that 
the number of migrants from CEE will increase by 335,000 initially. The increase will 
slow down to less than 150,000 by 2010. The stock of CEE migrants will increase to 
2.9 million in 2010 and 3.7 million in 2020. The peak number will be reached at 
around 3.9 million by 2032. These figures imply that the share of CEE migrants in 
current EU-15 will increase from 0.2% in 1998 to 1.1 % in 2030.  
 
These findings suggest that there might be an ‘ideological’ rather than a ‘real’ barrier 
to embracing free movement as a feasible and ethical policy choice. However, given 
the futility of the efforts to restrict migration since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, 
there is now an increasing awareness of the need to ‘manage’ rather than ‘control’ 
international migration. In fact, policy makers in developed countries are now 
increasingly inclined to accept that international migration ‘cannot be managed 
effectively … through national measures alone, and that collective efforts … are 
required to strengthen national capacities.’ (Solomon and Bartsch, 2003. See also, 
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Salt, 2002). The following paragraphs will try to articulate some general principles 
that could enhance the chance of success in the quest for managing international 
migration.  
 
3.1 Rethinking the role of the state 
 
The first principle is that there should be a paradigmatic shift in our approach to the 
role of the state in the regulation of international migration. As is well known, the 
conventional approach is based on a strictly realist view of the state, which is 
considered as the sole owner of the authority to determine who may enter and remain 
in its territory. Although it is not necessary to abandon the concept of the state as the 
ultimate regulatory authority in this area, there are compelling reasons as to why this 
authority should be re-defined.  
 
First of all, positioning the state as the sole authority that determines who enter and 
remains in its territory may weaken rather than strengthen the state’s policy 
autonomy. This is especially the case in the area of immigration because policy 
decisions in this area always involve trade-offs between the some ‘national’ interests 
that the state must prioritise and the interest of foreigners whom the nationals perceive 
as outsiders. As indicated in Ugur (1995), this type of ‘insider’-‘outsider’ divide 
enables even a very small minority of the nationals to emerge as veto groups. Such 
veto groups can block immigration policies that might be beneficial to other sections 
of the society. The irony is that the more the state is portrayed as a medieval gate 
keeper, the more likely it is that such veto groups would be able to impose their will 
both on the policy-maker and on the rest of the society. 8
 
  
The other reason why a strictly realist view of the state reduces policy autonomy is 
that the failure of restrictive immigration policies generates an exponential increase in 
the demand for further restrictions. As restrictive policies fail to stem immigration, 
veto groups become more vocal and critical. Their criticism will be based on the 
                                                          
8 Examples of veto groups in the area of immigration policy may include trade unions in migrant-
intensive segments of the labour market, regional authorities in migrant-intensive regions, xenophobic 
campaign groups in migrant-intensive neighbourhoods or schools, etc. Although opposing groups or 
voices can emerge against such veto groups, the influence of the former is likely to be less than that of 
the latter when the state (hence the public policy-maker) is expected to act as a gate-keeper keeping the 
‘trespassers’ out. 
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argument that the state has failed in the very area where it is accepted as the sole 
authority to act and where it is equipped with the necessary powers to defend the 
interests of its citizens.  
 
Therefore, the paradigmatic shift in our understanding of the state must involve a 
move away from the concept of the state as a medieval gate-keeper towards a more 
modern concept. In this concept, the state is still the ultimate authority in the 
regulation of migration, but the legitimacy of its regulatory power should be based not 
on its ability to control immigration. Just as it is the case in the area of free movement 
of goods and capital, the legitimacy of its regulatory policies should be determined by 
whether its actions are welfare-improving. In other words, and with the exception of 
security risks, the state’s responsibility to its population should no longer be equated 
with erecting border barriers. The state’s responsibility should involve regulation of 
the free entry of migrants with legitimate purposes (e.g., employment, service 
provision, holiday, etc.) with a view to increase welfare. 
 
3.2 Multilateralism 
 
The second principle should be to embrace multilateralism - just as it is the case with 
respect to movement of goods and capital. This is because unilateral policies are not 
likely to be either effective or efficient in managing migration. That unilateralism is 
ineffective is proven by the failure of the restrictive policies to prevent immigration. 
For example, at the end of the 1990s, it was estimated that each year around 400,000 
people enter the EU as a result of human trafficking and smuggling only (EU 
Commission, 2000: 13). This figure represents four- to eight-fold increase compared 
to estimates at the beginning of the 1990s and does not include overstays or other 
types of irregular migrants. Strikingly, it is much higher than the peak number of 
migrants estimated to move from CEE to current EU-15 as a result of free movement.  
 
Unilateralism would not be efficient either because, in a world characterised by 
interdependence, it is conducive to sub-optimal policy choices determined by strategic 
interaction. In addition, unilateralism involves a high degree of discretion and, 
thereby, reduces the coherence as well as the credibility of unilateral policies. The 
implication here is that either potential migrants or emigration country governments 
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will always question the legitimacy of the unilateral action and, therefore, they will 
refrain from co-operation or compliance.  
 
Bilateralism should also be rejected because, in addition to the coherence and 
credibility problems associated with unilateralism, it involves discrimination. As a 
result of discrimination, bilateral agreements are bound to remain non-transparent and 
will always be more costly to implement. Some policy analysts or practitioners (for 
example, Solomon and Bartsch, 2003; Lagenbacher, 2004; International Organisation 
for Migration, etc.) tend to think that regional co-operation may be conducive to an 
effective management of international migration. These expectations, however, are 
over-optimistic because regionalism may be conducive to effective global governance 
only if there is already a multilateral framework within which regional actors must 
act.9
 
  
In the absence of a multilateral framework that sets the parameters for collective 
action, regional arrangements may increase the risk of restrictive policies. This risk is 
likely to emerge for two reasons.  
 
First, from the theory of international trade policy, we know that the larger the 
country is, the higher is its ability to improve its terms of trade by erecting trade 
barriers. Because a regional bloc is larger than any of its members, it enables a group 
of countries to improve their terms of trade at the expense of their trading partners. In 
the case of trade, the improvement in the terms of trade is due to the protectionist 
bloc’s falling demand for imports that, in turn, depresses the export prices of trading 
partners. Therefore, in the absence of a multilateral framework, a regional bloc may 
well be motivated to be more restrictive than any of its members individually.10
 
 
In the case of international migration, welfare improvement is not necessarily the 
motive for excessive restrictions. The restrictive drive stems from the possibility of 
‘migration deflection’ within a regional bloc. Migration deflection refers to a situation 
                                                          
9 Ugur (2000) discusses why this is the case in the area of trade policy. The main finding there is that 
regionalism may in fact undermine global governance of trade flows unless there is a superior authority 
that would impose sanctions on regional blocs.  
10 It must be noted, however, that trade restrictions are conducive to decline in global welfare. This is 
because the gains for countries restricting imports are always smaller than the losses incurred by 
exporting countries.  
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where migrants enter the most restrictive member of the bloc via other member(s) that 
may have less restrictive policies. It is because of this deflection risk that the 
consolidation of intra-EU free movement after the single market has been 
accompanied by fortification of external borders. Put differently, regional 
arrangements for migration may become essentially hostage to the preferences of 
most restrictive bloc members. The irony is that protectionist members will also be 
able to secure more effective exclusion, which may not be feasible when each country 
acts alone.11
  
 
The second reason as to why regional regimes may be conducive to restrictive 
migration policies relates to the limited leverage capacity of sending countries. In the 
absence of a multilateral framework, countries of emigration will be in a weak 
position to negotiate with destination countries that form a regional bloc. This will be 
the case irrespective of whether or not sending countries form a regional bloc of their 
own. The latter, faced with a common stance of the destination countries, can either 
comply with or reject the proposals on the table. If the first option is chosen, the 
agreements between the two blocs will reflect the lowest common denominator 
determined by the preferences of the most restrictive member of the destination-
country bloc. If the second option is chosen, the destination-country bloc will react by 
erecting new restrictions in response to the non-cooperation of sending countries. 
 
Overall, in the absence of a multilateral framework, a regional approach to the 
management of international migration is highly likely to perpetuate the existing 
levels of restrictions or to generate a drive towards further restrictions. A multilateral 
framework based on non-discrimination can enable both sending and receiving 
countries to avoid the prisoners’ dilemma involved in non-cooperative interaction. 
 
                                                          
 
11 The dynamic involved here is the same as veto groups within the national context of public policy 
making. A single bloc member (i.e., a definite minority) can bloc the relaxation of the bloc’s migration 
policy. 
30 
 
 
3.3 Non-discrimination 
 
The third principle in the governance of free movement is that of non-discrimination. 
This should be similar to the non-discrimination principle of the World Trade 
Organisation, which consists of two provisions: most favoured nation (MFN) and 
national treatment. The MFN provision ensures that discrimination between trading 
partners is ruled out – i.e., countries or regional blocs are constrained to extend 
liberalisation to all trading partners. More significantly, however, the MFN provision 
will reduce the probability of resorting to restrictive measures as such measures will 
affect not only some targeted countries but other partners towards whom a more 
liberal policy is deemed appropriate.  
 
The national treatment provision prevents another type of discrimination: that 
between nationals and immigrants. This provision will ensure equality in the area of 
employment-related entitlements such as wages, working conditions, social insurance, 
health insurance, and hiring and firing conditions. National treatment will reduce any 
employer bias in favour of migrant labour and, thereby, moderate the wage 
dampening effect of immigration. Put differently, national treatment is necessary not 
only to prevent discrimination and possible ‘social dumping’, but also to limit the 
distributional effects of immigration. Finally, national treatment will increase the 
probability that immigration is determined by the demand for labour in the receiving 
country rather than the supply of labour in sending countries.  
 
3.4 A multilateral organisation 
 
The fourth principle should involve agreement on the necessity of a new multilateral 
organisation for the regulation of international migration. This can be labeled as 
World Migration Organization (WMO) and should exist in parallel to but 
independently of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). That is because neither the WTO nor UNHCR 
is appropriate for managing employment-seeking migration. The UNHCR is 
inappropriate because its main concern is the protection of the basic rights of refugees 
as a specific type of migrants. Of course, the UN still has an important role to play in 
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terms of setting standards that the new multilateral organisation for migration will 
have to internalise. An example of such contributions is the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families, which came into effect in 2003 after having been ratified by a number 
of sending countries.  
Recently, there have been suggestions that some principles of the General Agreement 
of Trade in Services (GATS) can be drawn upon in the global governance of 
migration. (See, for example, Niessen, 2004). Although the MFN and national 
treatment principles of the GATS are relevant for the proposed WMO, the GATS 
regime is essentially a recipe for discretion rather than binding and transparent rules. 
In the GATS, governments choose the sectors on which they will make commitments 
guaranteeing the right of foreign suppliers to provide services. Even for those services 
that are committed, governments may set limitations to market access and to the 
degree of national treatment they are prepared to guarantee. In addition, governments 
can also withdraw and renegotiate commitments. Given these high levels of 
discretion, the GATS is very far way from being a model for free movement. 
 
3.5 Return agreements 
 
The fifth principle in the governance of free movement is that the proposed WMO 
should include a model return agreement that must be finalised and accepted by all 
WMO members at the same time as they join the WMO. This is necessary in order to 
ensure that free movement is not a one-way flow and that migrants are aware of the 
risks involved in free movement. A free movement regime without return agreements 
would be compromised by an asymmetry that is a mirror image of the current 
asymmetry between emigration (which is free) and immigration (which is restricted). 
The current asymmetry is sometimes (and rightly) criticised as an indicator of 
inconsistency and even hypocrisy because, in a world of sovereign states, the freedom 
to emigrate cannot be exercised unless there is a state willing to accept the potential 
émigré.  
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To avoid the reverse asymmetry that may arise under free movement, sending country 
governments must accept the return of their citizens who may fail to secure 
employment in the receiving country or who may be expelled for reasons clearly laid 
out in the domestic law of the host country. Return agreements are also necessary to 
signal to potential migrants that they must balance the potential advantages of 
migration with relevant risks, including the risk of unemployment and return. In 
addition, return agreements will also put an end to the criminal stigma associated with 
deportation and make return a natural part of the migratory movements. As a result, 
return agreements will increase the probability that the migration decision is not a 
one-way bet. They will signal to potential immigrants that return to own country in 
periods of unemployment is not likely to prevent re-entry into the destination country 
in the future. Consequently, migrants will be less inclined to ‘go underground’ when 
their entitlement to remain in the destination country comes to an end because of 
failure to find jobs at a certain stage of their stay in the destination country.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis above enables us to derive a number of conclusions on the ethics, 
economics and governance of free movement of people. To avoid repetition, we will 
summarise these conclusions very briefly. Following that, we will elaborate on the 
tension between the desirability and feasibility of free movement. 
 
The first general conclusion is that an ethical case against free movement of people 
cannot be made if we define what is ethical as all actions that lead to an increase in 
social welfare. In addition, it is difficult to make an ethical case for treating the free 
movement of workers asymmetrically compared to free movement of goods and 
capital. All three types of movement are associated with positive impact on social 
welfare even though the benefits may be distributed asymmetrically between different 
social groups within a community – which is the unit of analysis in anti-free-
movement arguments.  
 
Asymmetric distribution of the benefits from free movement cannot be presented as a 
basis for an ethical argument against free movement. This is especially the case when 
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there is evidence suggesting that the distributional effects, in the form of 
unemployment or wage risks for the low-skilled labour force, tends to increase as 
labour and product market rigidities tend to increase. The redistributive effect can 
only imply taxing the beneficiaries of the free movement in order to compensate those 
affected adversely. Such taxation will be already part of the tax paid by employed 
migrants, who pay taxes to finance not only current welfare services that migrants 
enjoy in the host country, but also infrastructure investments that the migrant may or 
may not benefit from as long as the natives of the host country will. In addition, it is 
possible to impose an access charge (or an entrance permit fee) that will supplement 
normal taxation. Such compensation payments will serve the long-term interests of 
the compensated better if they can be made compatible with incentives for the latter to 
invest in skill enhancement.  
 
The analysis above also tackles the governance issue and identifies a number of 
principles that would reduce the risks associated with free movement. These 
principles include a welfare-based redefinition of the state’s legitimacy, the principle 
of effective international co-operation, the principle of institutionalised governance, 
the principle of non-discrimination, and the principle of symmetry in the treatment of 
migration and return.  
 
If an ethical or economic case cannot be made against free movement, to what extent 
is free movement a feasible policy option given the current political climate? The 
answer to this question is coloured with both optimism and pessimism. On the one 
hand, there are strong indications that developed countries are aware of the structural 
factors that would be conducive to higher levels of migration irrespective of the extent 
of restriction. These include persistent and increasing per capita income inequality 
between countries, different demographic structures, ease of international transport 
and communications, increase in the educational levels of people in less developed 
countries, and globalisation of the production process (OECD, 2003: 1).  
 
On the other hand, there are also indications of an emerging trend towards accepting 
the need for an international framework that would ‘manage’ rather than ‘restrict’ 
international migration. This trend is reflected in both OECD and Council of Europe 
reports and in the emergence of intergovernmental platforms such as the Berne 
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Initiative. (See, for example, Salt, 2002; and Solomon and Bartsch, 2003). According 
to Salt (2002), in the European context, the emerging trend reflects a degree of 
consensus on a number of principles that are compatible with the principles we 
identified in section 3. These include: (i) management rather than control of migration 
– a necessity recognised by governments as well as intergovernmental organisations; 
(ii) recognition of the positive impact of immigration; (iii) a comprehensive approach 
that avoids unintended consequences of piecemeal approach; and (iv) co-operation 
with third countries.   
 
Yet, the debate on migration is still coloured with an essentially ‘realist’ logic that 
tends to overlook objective criteria in favour of conventional concepts such as 
nationality and national interests as a basis for policy formulation. That is why even in 
the EU (which is the most developed regional regime of free movement) movement of 
third country nationals is still considered as a prerogative of member states, which 
would adopt common measures within a loose framework of co-operation and 
harmonisation. In addition, the proposed framework reflects explicit preferences in 
favour of selectivity, monitoring, and limiting migration as a basis for successful 
integration of existing migrants (EU Commission, 2000). These preferences are likely 
to clash with the principles we propose in section 3.  
 
Therefore, free movement and a truly global governance regime still seem beyond 
what is acceptable in the current political climate. Nevertheless, that something is not 
practically feasible in the current context does not imply either irrelevance or 
inferiority in terms of its outcomes. On the contrary, reiterating policy proposal that 
causes political discomfort in the current political climate may be the only way to 
minimise the risk of inefficiencies and injustice that result from political convenience. 
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